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COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



WAR PAPER 66. 

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COMMAWDE[(Y OF THE DI^TI^ICT OF COLOiyiBIi\. 



WAR PAPERS. 

66 

prepared by companion 

First Lieutenant 

GRANVILLE C. WEST, 

U. S. Volunteers, 

AND 

READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF DECEMBER 5, 1906. 






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In the fall of 1864 General Croxton's brigade of cavalry- 
was- constantly scouting through Middle Tennessee and North- 
ern Alabama. The brigade was composed of the First Tennes- 
see, Second Michigan, Eighth Iowa, and my regiment, the Fourth 
Kentucky Mounted Infantry. The hard work had been ex- 
hausting on "men and horses but still harder work was before 
us. Hood's invasion of Tennessee at this time was a despair- 
ing effort to disclose one gleam of light in a cause which 
seemed hopelessly lost. He had been appointed to the com- 
mand of the Army because Johnson had failed and he was 
expected to do something to check the tide of its adverse 
fortune. Among his first moves was to try the flanking 
tactics of Chancellorsville with disastrous results to his Army. 
Driven out of Atlanta, Hood's situation was really desperate 
and justified the resort to most any desperate measure that 
gave hope of a change for the better. He moved in a wide 
detour and attacked Sherman's supply line. In this he again 
failed and the situation was still more desperate. We then 
felt sure that we would soon have to grapple with him in 
Tennessee. My brigade had been through the Atlanta cam- 
paign and had been ordered back to Middle Tennessee, as 
stated, to look after roving bands of rebel cavalry. Late in 
September Forest invaded Tennessee with a large force of 
cavalry, and on the 27th we met him just south of Pulaski and 
fought him until dark. That night he withdrew and we fol- 
lowed him over half of Middle Tennessee and finally, October 
8th, drove him over the Tennessee River below Florence. 



Alabama. Under competent commanders we might have 
caught and virtually destroyed his force. We then scouted 
back toward Columbia and Pulaski, and Sunday, October 
1 6th, moved from the latter place on the road to Florence, 
Alabama, as we had learned at this time that Hood was on 
the march to that vicinity. I was in the advance in command 
of the First Battalion of the regiment and met a force of 
the enemy face to face in the road. I charged at him and he 
turned and fled. My horses were so worn out with hard 
service that I could not catch him, and we had a running fight 
all the afternoon. At every favorable position he made a 
stand and I had to charge and drive him out. At a small 
village, Center Star, he made a stand as if he intended to 
contest my further advance. As we came in range a volley 
of musketry met us and a bullet struck the horse of my or- 
derly at my side. I ordered an officer to take twenty-five men 
and make a quick detour through the woods to a road that 
came at right angles, to raise the yell, and charge, and I would 
meet him in the public square. A few minutes only were re- 
quired for this move, and we were in the village and the enemy 
flying toward Florence. Some distance further on he made a 
stand in a good position behind some houses and stables across 
a small creek. The road ran down the bank and into the 
stream, which it followed around his position and up the 
bank and high ground beyond. As we came in range, the 
usual volley of musketry greeted us and a bullet went through 
my horse's ear. A charge along the road and up on the high 
ground beyond cut off his retreat, and his only chance of 
escape was to take to the thick woods, near by, into which 
nothing but a frightened rebel could penetrate, and we saw 
no more of him. The command then moved to the vicinity of 
Florence, Alabama, and for several days was scouting and 



watching in that section. As expected, Hood appeared on 
the opposite bank of the Tennessee River, and on October 31st 
laid a pontoon bridge to an island in the river and threw a 
brigade over, who waded the shallow water on our side, 
and thus obtained a foothold near Florence and rapidly crossed 
his Army. After several days of skirmishing we retired 
across Shoal Creek, a rugged, rapid stream that empties into 
the Tennessee River above Florence. November 5th a large 
force of the enemy appeared on the opposite side and three 
regiments of our brigade were engaged in a brisk musketry 
fire across the creek, my regiment in reserve on the high 
ground above. The road at this point runs on the brink of a 
high, rugged bank of the creek and descends gradually down 
to the ford and bridge to the level of the banks beyond, where 
the fight was on. This road was the only way of ©scape for 
our forces in case of necessity. A lack of vigilance on the part 
of the commanding general came near disastrous results for 
us. A brave and heroic dash only saved the three regiments 
from capture. A division of the enemy had quietly crossed 
the creek down near the river, and was in our rear not two 
hundred yards away before discovered. My regiment mounted 
instantly and moved rapidly through a small open woods to an 
open field, some fifty yards wide, to thick woods beyond the 
fence, in which the enemy's line was advancing. As I came 
into the open with my command a furious volley of musketry 
opened on us from the enemy's line in the woods and a bullet 
broke my horse's thigh. In the face of this galling fire we 
had to form on right into line. The general galloped up at 
this moment and gave me the order to "dismount, charge, 
and drive those fellows out of the woods." The situation was 
serious and no time to consider, but I have since thought that 
an order to a small battalion of dismounted cavalry to drive 



out a whole division of the enemy, massed in the woods, was 
somewhat amusing. The order to charge was promptly obeyed^ 
and almost instantly, in a dash, we were at the fence and the 
enemy's line not fifty yards away. This was one of the places 
that I did not expect to get out of. I expected to be killed or 
captured. But the dash was so sudden and daring, and the 
fire from our carbines so furious, that it checked the enemy 
a little while and in the meantime the regiments engaged in 
the fight across the creek below had passed out on the road. 
I plainly heard the enemy's order "forward," and I gave the 
order to withdraw, and succeeded in bringing my battalion 
out. It was a close call, the enemy's line following right up 
to the road, and a soldier was killed in the road right under 
the feet of my horse that, somehow, I had caught and mounted. 
After the fight the enemy, having accomplished but little, re- 
tired across Shoal Creek, and our brigade again moved up to 
the same position, and continued to watch Hood's movements. 
That very day General Stanley took position at Pulaski. Ten- 
nessee, with his corps, when he should have done so at Law- 
renceburg, which was on the direct road from Florence to 
Columbia. If Hood had crossed the river at Decatur, Ala- 
bama, then the station at Pulaski would have been all right but 
at Pulaski he could not and did not accomplish anything. Gen- 
eral Schofield, in the meantime, having assumed command there. 
November 12th I went with a flag of truce to Shoal Creek. 
This was not of much importance, it was only a ruse to over- 
look the ground and see the best place to obstruct the road. 
The next night the regiment went down, drove the enemy away, 
and felled trees to blockade the road. Monday, November 
2 1st, Hood began his move and we retired skirmishing in the 
direction of Lawrenceburg, and as we were fighting the enemy 
through the streets of that townSchofield was stillholdinffon at 



Pulaski, as far from Columbia as Lawrenceburg. It was then 
a race between them to reach Columbia, and Schofield barely 
got in first, when he should have been there two or three days 
before, and his trains all across Duck River and on the road 
to Franklin. Columbia was no place to make a stand, anyhow. 
The city and high ground are on the south side of Duck 
River, and a force defending it has the river behind to cross 
if pressed back, and the retreating force when across is on 
low ground, and the assailant has every advantage, besides the 
place is easily flanked above and below the town, as the sequel 
showed. November 25th our brigade crossed Duck River on 
the Franklin pike and bivouacked, Hood closely investing Co- 
lumbia on the south. November 28th we moved ofif the pike 
to the right, up the river through fields and woods, and dis- 
covered Hood's Army crossing the river above Columbia, 
aiming to secure the road to Franklin. The danger to Schofield 
in Columbia was apparent and imminent. He faced impending 
destruction. It was a very disagreeable day, snowing and 
cold. Sometime during the night of the 28th we reached the 
Franklin and Lewisburg pike, formed line of battle across 
the road, bivouacked in the snow and cedars, to await the coming 
dawn and Forest's Cavalry, and they both came together. This 
was the morning of the 2gth, and all day we were fighting in 
a death struggle holding the enemy back from Franklin and 
and Schofield's line of retreat. At Mt. Carmel we found part 
of General Hatch's Cavalry well posted, and, with artillery. 
Rutherford's Creek and valley in front, and over which we 
had passed, the enemy following closely, came swarming and 
yelling out of the cedars beyond the valley like legions of wild 
Comanches. It was absolutely necessary to check the advance 
of Forest here. Our brigade was properly posted in line, my 
command on the extreme right along a yard and garden 



8 

fence at the head of a small valley that ran a hundred yards 
down to the bottom, where were a lot of buildings, behind 
which the enemy swarmed and from which furious volleys di 
musketry were kept up. The artillery opened and the fight was 
fierce now all along the line. During the battle some houses 
took fire in the village. The battle had driven the women and 
children into the houses and the fire drove them into the 
streets, producing a scene of wild commotion. The cheers 
and yells of the assaulting hosts, the counter-cheers of our own 
forces, the rattle of musketry, the thunders of artillery and 
exploding shells, the women and children running screaming 
through the streets, the hissing flames as they rolled in con- 
suming fuiy, mountain high, made up a battle scene of pathetic 
but surpassing grandeur. Between my horses and a log house 
in the yard two little child tots were busy with their childish 
amusements, too young to realize their peril, and seemingly 
oblivious to the storm of battle that raged so savagely around 
them, the mother in the house too frightened to come to their 
rescue. Forest found that he could not dislodge us at this 
point ; he ceased his attacks and moved ofif to Spring Hill, six 
miles west, and succeeded in capturing a few wagons near 
that place on the Columbia pike, some twelve miles in Scho- 
field's rear and on his line of retreat. Our brigade hurried 
on to Franklin that night. Schofield, realizing his peril at 
Columbia, moved out, which he should have done the day be- 
fore, and all that night of the 29th his trains and troops were 
moving in a thin line along the pike to Franklin, where he 
should have been twenty- four hours before, and his train two 
days before. Two whole corps of Hood's Army, and Forest's 
Cavalry, had crossed Duck River above Columbia the 28th, 
and on the night of the 29th were massed along the road near 
Spring Hill, in sight of Schofield's retreating line. Schofield's 



position was perilous in the extreme. His thin retreating line 
stretched along the road for miles, encumbered by his trains 
and no part of his force in position to support any other part 
of his line if attacked. His escape borders on the marvelous. 
If Hood had attacked that night, success was in his grasp, and 
there is no reason why he should have failed. It was a situa- 
tion in war that probably has no parallel, a retreating army in 
weary march all night along a road, in hailing distance of 
which, and in gunshot of which, the enemy was massed in 
overwhelming numbers. Hood claims that he ordered the at- 
tack to be made, but his subordinates do not seem to verify 
this claim. At any rate, the opportunity was in Hood's 
reach to win a signal victory and he let it slip away from him. 
The Confederate historian says that General Bate, about mid- 
night of the 29th, spoke to General Hood about the conflict 
of orders and the failure to seize the road at Spring Hill and 
cut off the retreat of the enemy. Hood replied : "It makes no 
difference now, it is all right. General Forest informs me 
that he holds the turnpike north of Spring Hill and will stop 
the enemy if he tries to pass to Franklin. We will have a 
surrender in the morning without a fight. We can sleep 
quietly to-night." The truth is, Forest, as stated, had left us 
at Mt. Carmel and dashed into the road near Spring Hill and 
captured a few wagons, but his possession of the road was of 
short duration, for he was very soon driven out. The last 
of Schofield's forces reached Franklin about daylight on the 
morning of the 30th, our cavalry still holding Forest back on 
the Lewisburg pike. Schofield had held on so long at Colum- 
bia that he could not bring away his pontoons and had to 
destroy them, and he had made no provision for crossing 
Harpeth River at Franklin, and bridges had to be then impro- 
vised that morning. 



10 

In a hand-to-hand struggle our cavalry held Forest back 
from the plain south of Franklin until Hood's infantry came 
up. As the line of infantry advanced, we crossed Harpeth 
River at McGavick's Ford, above Franklin, to the high ground 
on the north side and overlooking the plain south, over which 
Hood's Army was moving to the attack. The river here 
makes a sharp bend to the north, and leaves Franklin in a 
plain extending south, with here and there a few small knolls. 
The high ground is on the north side of the river, and occa- 
sionally assumed the dignity of a blufif. Where we crossed the 
river the bluff is much higher and overlooked the country 
south. I was ordered to take position along this bluff, behind 
a fence, from which place I could see the advance of the rebel 
army. About three o'clock in the afternoon his lines moved 
to the attack, and the battle of Franklin was on and in des- 
peration. As a French historian has said of the great battle of 
Borodino, Franklin, on our part, was a battle without a plan 
and without a general. Hood, no doubt, chagrined at his 
failure the night before, staked the success of his campaign on 
this battle, and for five or six hours, and long into the night, 
the fighting was terrific and desperate. Hood had his whole 
army in hand, more than forty thousand men, and he could 
have, and no reason why he should not, bring at least thirty 
thousand men into action, and his assaults were brave, gallant, 
daring, desperate, savage. Nothing but the bold, unyielding 
determination of the line officers and men saved our forces 
from disastrous defeat. They repulsed assault after assault 
and wave upon wave of the oncoming foe, who seemed to 
assail with contempt of danger and death, and for six hours 
few battles can show more desperate fighting. All this time 
General Wilson, with our cavalry, was on the north side of the 
river watching Forest above, and on the Lewisburg pike. 



n 

But Forest crossed higher up, and bore down upon us attempt- 
mg to reach the Nashville pike north of Franklin. There was 
danger for us in this move, and it had to be checked at any cost, 
and like a thunderbolt we dashed at him, and in half an hour 
there was not a rebel soldier on the north side of the river. 
We gave him such a complete whipping that it was noted in 
our command that he did not venture to attack us again during 
the next two days. Hood's failure was disastrous, and he 
lost nearly six thousand of his best soldiers, with thirteen gen- 
eral officers. This defeat took the fight out of his army. 
Every soldier of our army who did his duty at the battle of 
Franklin, November 30th, 1864, deserves more from his coun- 
try than he has ever received. The vast consequences of an 
overwhelming victory for Hood there is a matter into which 
this paper does not enter. It might have been far-reaching. 
That night our infantry quietly withdrew to Nashville, my 
brigade, still scouting the country east, passed through the 
picket lines around Nashville on the Nolinsville pike about two 
o'clock on the morning of the 3d of December. Hood fol- 
lowed and invested the city and fortified his position. But he 
now faced a master on the field of battle, Maj. Gen. George H. 
Thomas. For two weeks the weather was detestable, mean, 
cold, and snow. December 15, 1864, dawned somewhat bet- 
ter. The whole scene changed. Hood was now on the de- 
fensive, and Thomas the master of the assaulting line. It was 
a scene to be remembered. The cavalry moved to the attack 
on the enemy's extreme left, stormed and took the works, and 
captured prisoners and artillery. The battle of Nashville was 
on. Thomas' line gradually moved forward and occupied 
favorable positions. Battery after battery got into place and 
opened on the enemy's works. Along in the afternoon I was 
fortunate to be so situated that I could see more than a mile 



12 

of the enemy's works and the hne of battle. A dark cloud 
hung- over the combatants, and the order to assault passed 
along the Hne which rose, and, with a cheer, started on the 
double quick. The artillery elevated their pieces 'and threw 
the missies over the heads of the charging column, and the 
flash of exploding shells in that dark cloud presented a pyro- 
technic display of singular beauty. Our forces mounted the 
enemy's works and, when the breach was made, the whole 
rebel line lifted, as far as I could see, and fled in confusion. 
It was a charge and a battle scene of tragic splendor that can 
not fade from the memory. Tragic, because many of the gal- 
lant boys who started never reached the enemy's works. They 
dropped from the ranks to rise and fight no more. That was 
the dark side and sad feature of the triumph. This was along 
the Hillsboro and the Granny White pikes. Night closed the 
strife. Next morning the attack was renewed all along the 
line, and our forces captured nearly everything — prisoners 
and artillery as they went — and the last I saw of the enemy 
that day he was flying in retreat through the Brentwood hills, 
beaten and his army destroyed. He was driven back across the 
Tennessee River, and Hood's Army, as a distinct organiza- 
tion, disappeared from history. General Thomas thus gave 
the death-blow to the rebellion in that part of the country, and 
had he a master like the great Napoleon he would have been 
exalted in rank, and would be known in history as the "Prince 
of the Cumberland." 



